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Abstract 
Approving or disapproving of athletes’ moral conduct and character is commonplace. In this essay I explore to 
what extent such judgments are valid and reliable moral judgments. I identify some methodological problems 
associated with making moral judgments particularly, but not exclusively, from a virtue perspective. I argue that 
we have no reliable access to states of mind needed to make informed evaluations. Moreover, even if such 
access was available, the validity of our judgments would be compromised or limited by our own moral 
character.  
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Introduction 
The claim that playing sport can, or does, make a valuable contribution to one’s moral character endures despite 
the mountain of purported falsifying evidence. In 2018 the British cricketer Ben Stokes was cleared of a criminal 
offence (affray) although his governing body, the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB), have found him guilty 
of bringing the game into disrepute. Serena Williams’ character has also been scrutinised following her 
altercation with an umpire during the 2018 US Open tennis championship. There is no shortage of examples of 
athletes behaving badly. Such examples present difficulties for those whose inclination is to defend the thesis 
that sport can provide a context where good character can be displayed and cultivated.  My aim in this paper is 
to revisit the topic of sport and moral character, 20 years after completing my PhD thesis on the subject. The 
overarching conclusion I drew in my thesis was that a neo-Aristotelian or virtue ethics approach was best suited 
to examine the complex subject of sport and character. At the time I was convinced that such an approach was 
superior to the growing number of Kohlberg (1981, 1984) influenced empirical studies examining sport and 
character1. In this paper I revisit some of the issues I covered in both my thesis and in subsequent published 
articles. There are some issues I won’t be addressing in this paper. Specifically, I won’t be seeking to defend any 
particular ethical theory (e.g. virtue theory over deontology) although there will inevitably be some discussion 
of theory2. Nor will I be seeking to defend whether this or that action best instantiates any particular virtue, 
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value or principle - such as courage, justice or honesty. My intention is to examine some rudimentary difficulties 
with making basic ordinary language assessments of athletes’ moral conduct and character.  
Approval and Disapproval 
Roy Keane’s knee high tackle on Alf-Inge Håland in 2001 and Matthew Rees helping a fellow competitor across 
the line at the 2017 London Marathon elicit disapproval for the former and approval for the latter. But what 
exactly is the subject of our approval? Their actions, their character, both? Foot (2002, 189) argues that 
philosophers interested in moral approval/disapproval tend to look to ‘internal’ features of the individual such 
as feeling and thought in order to inform their evaluation. There must be a reason why Keane injured Håland 
and the reason, as well as the behaviour, is standardly considered to be vital data.   Keane injured Håland because 
he wanted to, it was his deliberate intention to do so. Moreover his motive for doing so was festering resentment 
and a desire for revenge (Keane has admitted as much in his autobiography). These facts about Keane provide 
an explanation of his behaviour. Rees helped his fellow runner because he empathised with him. Keane’s 
bitterness and Rees’s empathy are the grounds on which our approval or disapproval are constructed.  
The belief that mental events issue in behaviour in this way seems obvious, but is by no means uncontested. The 
psychologist B.F. Skinner was sceptical about attributing the cause of observable behaviour to inner mental 
states. Inner mental processes can’t be observed and discussing such things, he claimed, is unscientific.  He 
proposed a science of behaviour that eschewed the unobservable and focused on the observable – namely the 
behaviour and the environmental contingencies that reinforced it.  
The behaviours classified as good or bad and right and wrong are not due to goodness or badness, or 
good or bad character, or a knowledge of right and wrong; they are due to contingencies involving a 
great variety of reinforcers including the generalized verbal reinforcers of ‘Good!’ ‘Bad!’ ‘Right!’ and 
‘Wrong!’ (Skinner 1971, 112-113) 
 
If Skinner is right then psychology as the study of the mind is redundant. Psychology becomes a mystical practice.   
Most contemporary accounts of human action in general and moral action in particular are committed to some 
account of a moral agent in terms of the mind vis-à-vis dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, thoughts and emotions. 
These features come together in an individual and exemplify ‘characteristic ways of thinking and acting’ 
(Kupperman 1991, 5).  Our personality or character issue in a distinctive identity – it is part of what makes us 
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unique. For Kupperman (1991, 7) ‘Character has a vital role in how we act. That is, to have character is to act in 
such a way that the person one is plays a major role in any explanation of ones’ behaviour’.   
What do we need to know? 
If we believe that ‘internal factors’ explain moral action then we need to specify which particular ‘internal 
factors’ we need to access and what are their definitive qualities. For virtue theorists dispositions in general and 
moral dispositions in particular are the target. Annas (2001, 111) argues that ‘what makes a disposition a virtue 
is not the results it produces but, broadly speaking, the attitude of the person who has the virtue’. For Annas 
(2001) (and other virtue theorists) the important attitude is characterised both by a kind of affective 
commitment to the good, but also knowledge or understanding of the good. Virtue involves a commitment to 
the good because it is good. To be truly virtuous (moral excellence) is to act for the right reasons. Knowledge 
and understanding of the good/right are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions of the moral action. A 
commitment to knowledge of the good in moral evaluation is not limited to virtue accounts. Kohlberg’s (1981, 
1984) Kantian influenced theory and the methods it employed is perhaps the most systematic cognitive 
developmental expression of this commitment.  
A cognitive commitment presents an obvious difficulty when we seek to approve or disapprove. As Skinner 
(1971) argued, it, if there is an ‘it’ (the decisive antecedent mental state) is not readily accessible to us. All sorts 
of complex philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific questions about mind states, brains states, 
causation, determinism, free will and so forth loom large here. For the purpose of this paper I’ll attempt to 
sidestep these ‘big’ problems and focus on a more prosaic difficulty, namely how we access the data we need 
to decide whether any given agent’s understanding is worthy.  Consider the plight of the young football team 
and their coach who got trapped in caves in Thailand recently. In order to save the 12 young boys and their 
coach from deep inside flooded caves, a rescue team performed prima facie courageous acts. They risked their 
lives in extreme conditions in order to bring the trapped boys and their coach to safety. Were they really 
courageous? The question seems rather churlish yet it is a question that valid moral assessment seems to 
demand. From a virtue perspective the current question is not whether their acts successfully struck the golden 
mean between cowardice on the one hand and recklessness on the other, but whether any given rescuer had 
the appropriate state of mind – a commitment to the good because it is good (or some such) – to qualify them 
as properly courageous. Virtue theory is committed to discriminating between, or even ranking the divers, 
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according to their knowledge and commitment to the good.  Such a process would not involve looking at their 
actions; did some overcome more risks than others, did some face more danger than others (although some of 
these might be ultimately relevant) – but would involve scrutinizing the diver’s understanding of their actions in 
terms of a moral idea, value or virtue that frames it. If the rescue divers’ reasons for action were revealed we 
might indeed find that some rescuers are purportedly better (morally speaking) than others.  
Let us suppose that a rescuer informed us that their reasons for helping were largely self-interested. The thrill 
and excitement, the opportunity to test one’s technical skills and the sense of satisfaction that would be wrought 
by being involved in the rescue were his reasons for action. Perhaps fame and adulation were also a motive.  
Such a cave diver seems to be morally indifferent (Sanderse 2015). He has a mistaken idea of happiness – in 
terms of honour, bodily pleasure or money. Such a person has not developed the ability (acquired the 
knowledge) to discern the good nor the stable disposition to feel and act virtuously (Curzer 2002). Similarly from 
a Kohlbergian perspective, those able to provide reasons that were more adequate – grounded in universal 
ethical principles (indicative of a more advanced stage of moral maturity) would be evaluated more favourably 
(morally speaking) than those unable to articulate such reasons.  
On both an Aristotelian and Kohlbergian reading, the self-interested cave diver’s reasons are not just inferior 
moral reasons, but arguably not moral reasons at all. To reiterate - whatever the consequences of his actions - 
this rescuer’s reasons (and therefore his actions) are at best morally inferior/immature and at worst not moral 
at all.  
The judgment problem 
We have seen that both virtue and Kohlbergian approaches are committed to evaluating the agent and to do so 
we must know something more about the agent than what she did. I want to focus on two important 
implications. One is about criteria – identifying the standards used for judging moral agents. This is about 
deciding whether this or that action is praiseworthy (rescuing children from caves is ceteris paribus good, leaving 
them stranded is ceteris paribus bad), and on what grounds this or that person deserves our approval for acting. 
The second is about method or judgment in light of the criteria. Even if we have criteria, difficulties arise in 
accessing the information we need to make an informed judgment in light of any particular criterion.    
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Initially I will try and deal with the two implications separately starting with method. How can we tell if someone 
is virtuous or morally mature? The problem is not confined to sport, but sport does bring the issue into stark 
relief. When we watch sport we make all sorts of judgments about the players. We praise and criticise them for 
their technical and tactical acumen, their physical efforts as well as their moral conduct. We want our judgments 
to be reliable and valid i.e. we want the players to deserve our praise or criticism. For the most part the evidence 
we require for our technical, tactical and effort judgments is publically available. The foot making clean contact 
with the ball causing it to fly into the top corner of the goal is evidence of the skill of the player. The efforts of 
the players at the end of a 90 minute (or 120 minute) football match is writ-large on their bodies. Further 
evidence of effort is provided by analysts who will tell us that player A covered X amount of kilometres in the 
game. The analysts will also provide evidence that a particular tactical system employed was effective. We can 
be reasonably confident therefore (but rarely certain) when we make such judgments that they are accurate. 
The so-called ‘truth makers’ are available to us (Mumford 2006). Where judgments about moral conduct are 
concerned, however, things are far more difficult. The decisive evidence – the truth maker – is not available to 
us. We can’t see the necessary mind states.  
At a crucial stage during the final of the 2018 World Cup a header from the French player Samuel Umtiti struck 
the left arm of the Croatian player Ivan Perišić. The VAR (Video Assistant Referee) invited the on field referee to 
review footage of the incident to decide whether Perišić deliberately handled the ball. Following the review the 
referee judged that Perišić had and awarded a decisive penalty to France. There is no doubt that the use of the 
VAR improved the referee’s view of the incident, but neither the referee nor the watching millions are granted 
(by the replays) the requisite epistemological privilege (Collins 2010) necessary to judge the ‘mental state’ of 
intentionality, and thereby Perišić’s guilt or innocence.  
Accessing the requisite cognitive antecedents implicated in more complex moral acts is even more difficult. The 
problem is exacerbated in sport because of the time-constrained and fast-paced nature of the activity. Rarely is 
there an (formal) opportunity to ‘build’ and ‘prosecute’ a case for or against the character of an athlete where 
we might seek to introduce and test evidence that they are virtuous or vicious. We do informally draw 
conclusions about the character of certain athletes. We are more likely to blame and condemn athletes who 
have a track record of ill-discipline, for example Uruguay’s Luis Suarez, when they commit another vicious act. 
Conversely we often hear ‘he’s not that kind of player’ in mitigation of athletes who commit a vicious act for the 
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first time. One such example is Welsh football international Neil Taylor’s tackle that broke Seamus Coleman’s 
leg in a World Cup qualifying match in 2017. Despite the recklessness of the tackle and the serious injury it 
caused, many sought to draw our attention to Taylor’s overall exemplary character on and off the pitch. But 
these opinions are formed in light of observed patterns of behaviour. They are not particularly robust and are 
certainly not informed by data about mental states or dispositions.  
The empirical studies that employed Kohlbergian inspired methods to designate athletes’ level of moral maturity 
purportedly solved the problem by accessing and evaluating cognition and understanding. In order to do so, 
however, they had to use post-hoc self-report measures (in the main, participants were asked to reason about 
a moral dilemma and their judgments were recorded and analysed). Notwithstanding standard reservations 
about the validity of both self-report and post hoc methods, their use by Kohlberg (1981, 1984) and others with 
respect to moral agency invoke specific concerns. These methods are adopted because of the bipartite 
commitment to the belief that moral cognition plays a vital part in moral action, and that moral cognition can 
be accessed (using such methods). In other words a commitment to the idea that those who know the good 
choose the good (McNamee et al 2003). Blasi (1980, 9) argues that cognitive-developmental theory simply 
hypothesizes a positive-correlation between cognition and action and that it ‘is unreasonable to expect that the 
knowledge of a person’s moral criteria will enable us to predict what specific action he or she will take in a given 
situation’. Even if we were able to access beliefs and values in isolation from the action, we cannot be sure that 
they either explain the action (might be a rationalisation) or produced the action (it might have been another 
belief or value).  
Even if we accept that knowledge is necessary, it is widely accepted that it is not sufficient for virtue. Curzer’s 
(2002) reading of Aristotle identifies five components of virtue. First is the ability to identify virtuous actions in 
any given situation. This ‘component’ has variously been described as being able to see (Flanagan 1991) or 
perceive (Rorty 1988; Blum 1994) morally salient features of a situation. This component gets us going in a sense 
– it produces saliency. The second component Curzer identifies is understanding. This is the component I’ve 
been discussing above i.e. ‘reflective understanding of the good’. The third is an intrinsic desire for virtue or the 
love of virtue for its own sake. This component deals with the motive for moral action – the commitment to the 
right or the good. It is a matter of ‘taking it to heart’ or ‘making it second nature’ (Curzer 2002, 143). The fourth 
component Curzer identifies is the disposition to virtuous action and the fifth is the disposition to virtuous 
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passion. These final two components introduce the aretaic dimension seeking to tie moral action to a person’s 
moral character in a substantial way. We might look at these ‘components’ in different ways. For example, we 
might see each as a separate psychological process or mechanism and/or we might see them as instruments to 
virtue-neutral executive qualities whose moral worth is derivative of virtuous action which they may play a part 
in realising3. Detailed exposition of these ‘other’ components in general and how any given individual acquires 
virtue (and the role of instruction, teaching, habituation practice and exemplars therein) are beyond the scope 
of this article. The point is that the nature and quality of these additional (and vital) components/mechanisms 
of moral virtue or moral action are also opaque. We have no reliable access to them when making our judgments. 
We don’t know if any given cave diver or athlete has an intrinsic desire for virtue or some such.         
The Criteria Problem 
Let us put aside for a moment the methodological concerns and turn to possible criteria.  In other words if we 
had valid and reliable access to the information we needed to make judgments, what might we conclude about 
the character of any given individual? Both Aristotle and Kohlberg’s criteria suggest that the truly good is an 
aspirational ideal.  Moreover it is unlikely that any of the rescuers, despite these extraordinary acts (it’s worth 
remembering that a diver had already died navigating the flooded caves) would qualify as fully virtuous on 
Aristotelian grounds or fully morally mature on Kohlberg’s terms.  Meeting the lofty ideals of proper virtue (or 
stage 6 moral maturity) is beyond all but the most saintly, and certainly beyond our common or garden athlete. 
It is therefore moot to ask whether any given athlete’s actions are good or if their character is virtuous. The 
answer is always no if we mean ‘properly’ virtuous. So if we praise using terms like courageous, honest and just, 
it seems we are not really saying they are courageous, honest and just, so what are we saying? 
One way to go is to reject the theories that have such high expectations or ideals and argue that because such 
standards are not realistic or achievable (they demand a psychology which we cannot achieve) they neither 
merit our respect nor our efforts. We go for a more ‘human’ sized conception of moral goodness (Blum 1994, 
Flanagan 1991 and Pincoffs 1996). This is a strategy I employed in my PhD thesis, and subsequently (Jones 2011), 
arguing that a virtue theory need not table such a demanding end point for development. The goal of moral 
development, I argued, might best be conceived more pluralistically in terms of exemplifying some (but not all) 
moral excellences in certain contexts (like sport). This amounted to rejecting the ‘unity of the virtue’ thesis.  My 
objective was in part to ensure that athletes’ could legitimately, despite moral failings, be candidates for praise. 
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More recently I considered whether Blum’s (1994) distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘noteworthy’ virtue might 
provide the criteria to praise athletes and to justify their role model status in the absence of virtue proper (Jones 
2016). In other words, an athlete might not be fully courageous (noteworthy), but might nevertheless display 
and merit approval for ordinary courage. Both strategies, I thought, addressed two purported problems with an 
Aristotelian account of virtue (unity of virtue and the unattainability of proper virtue) whilst retaining the 
centrally important features. I thought I could retain the baby whilst throwing out the bathwater.    
Can we pick and choose- the problem of phronesis?     
I am no longer sure whether either strategy is plausible. The virtue concept is complex and rooted in an 
overarching social, moral and psychological framework. As we have seen there are five components implicated 
in virtue and each of these encompasses different processes, mechanisms and qualities. How these ‘come-
together’ to produce virtue (identify and enact the good) is a crucial, but extremely challenging problem. 
Aristotle’s (and many neo Aristotelians) solution to the problem is to turn to the concept of practical wisdom 
(phronesis). Practical wisdom is a complex idea so I will offer only the briefest sketch here before discussing its 
implication for this paper. Practical wisdom is the capacity to ‘get things right’ in relation to moral action. It 
encompasses or embodies all the five of the components discussed above. Practical wisdom is implicated in 
striking the golden mean, it takes us from the general (principle) to the particular (action that instantiates the 
principle). According to Simpson (1997, 248–249) it’s a kind of perception– of ‘judging the here and now’. 
Practical wisdom does a considerable amount of the ‘heavy lifting’ in terms of an Aristotelian moral psychology. 
To some extent it is an elusive quality, yet fundamental. I have argued previously (Jones 2017) that the 
implication of Aristotelian practical wisdom is not fully appreciated by many who turn to it to explain how 
individuals ‘get things right’ in terms of judgment and action in all kinds of situations. Practical wisdom is not a 
supplementary free-floating quality that is applied to, or brought to bear on, a given situation. Perhaps the 
following passage from Aristotle himself implies that phronesis is somehow separate from virtue.    
…the full performance of a man’s function [eudaimonia] depends upon a combination of prudence and 
moral virtue; virtue ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim, and prudence that of the 
means towards it (Aristotle 2004, 163).  
 
The truth about practical wisdom, however, is that it cannot be separated from virtue and choice. Decision or 
action ‘cannot be correct in default either of prudence or of goodness’ (Aristotle 2004, 163). This ‘integrated’ 
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picture of practical wisdom has important implications for a virtue account of moral action. Annas (2011) 
believes that if we want practical wisdom in our theory of virtue (and I think we must have at least something 
like the concept of practical wisdom), we also have to commit to the ‘unity of virtue’– i.e. the idea of a complete 
stable and integrated collection (mentioned above).  A commitment to phronesis implies or necessitates a 
commitment to the unity of virtue.  Annas (2011, 86) argues that 
…practical intelligence develops over your character as a whole, in a holistic way. You can’t develop 
generosity in the absence of fairness and tact; you can develop a character trait, but it won’t be 
generosity, since it will fail to get things right in action, and the result will be not generosity but 
extravagance or self-advertisements. To the extent that you are truly generous, you get everything right 
when acting generously, and to do this you have to get things right in other aspects of your character 
also.   
 
There isn’t a courage ‘practical wisdom’ or a justice ‘practical wisdom’, but rather a practical wisdom which 
unifies and integrates different features of a situation and different virtues to get it right overall. Consequently 
to have one virtue (courage) you need phronesis (lest you be reckless or dishonest in your actions), but if you 
have phronesis you have all the virtues (Annas 2011, 86).  
Developmental criteria 
This brings us back to the problem of evaluating and approving. If we go for the ‘pluralistic’ version (some virtues 
not others) then we must abandon practical wisdom. But can we really say that the athlete who is brave, but 
dishonest, or fair, but mean is praiseworthy? It seems counterintuitive to approve of their courage and fairness 
whilst at the same time disapproving of their dishonesty and meanness. Practical wisdom rescues us from this 
type of quandary. It tells us that there is an ultimate ‘right’ choice to make here for the agent. If we imagine an 
athlete with practical wisdom, such an athlete should act according to the overall good which might not be 
characterised by courage, honesty or fairness but in terms of some other virtue such as magnanimity. It seems 
that adopting the ordinary-noteworthy approach runs into similar problems. Surely we ought not to approve of 
an ordinary act of virtue if the overall good is diminished. Knowing whether this particular act of courage or this 
particular act of ordinary virtue undermines the overall good demands virtue and practical wisdom that are 
beyond both the moral agent acting and the moral agent approving or disapproving of said act and agent.       
Annas (2011) seems to offer another way out of the problem. It does make sense, she insists, to both hold on to 
the ideal of proper virtue and approve or disapprove in terms of progress towards virtue.  I can, without 
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contradiction, praise my 5 year old boy for being kind even though I know he falls short (as do we all) of having 
the virtue of kindness. He is learning ‘basic’ kindness or learning to be kind in this and/or that situation. He is 
forming and cultivating the disposition of kindness (and others) which will form part of an integrated character.   
We are quite free to call someone brave or generous when they fulfil the conditions in which we learned 
what bravery and generosity are. At the same time we are quite clear that they are not fully brave or 
generous; they do not indicate to us everything that these virtues involve (Annas 2011, 89-90).  
 
A developmental approach is faithful to Aristotle who recognised that virtue evolved and matured given the 
right circumstances and attitudes. Sanderse (2015) identifies four stages of moral development in Aristotle:  
a) Moral indifference (the many).    
The morally indifferent are not necessarily bad but have a misguided understanding of happiness. Bodily or 
lower order pleasures dominate and there is no appreciation of higher order pleasures or at least moral and 
intellectual virtue don’t feature in their flourishing (Sanderse 2015, 388). Perhaps they lack the desire to aspire 
(Annas 2011) (among other things) because they have not been taught or habituated to develop the appropriate 
dispositions. Those at this level are not distinguished from higher levels by their behaviour, but by the reasons 
for their behaviour. As we saw above, the ‘brave’ cave rescuer or the ‘altruistic’ marathon runner might both be 
acting selfishly.    
b) Lack of self-control (incontinence)  
According to Sanderse (2015) those at this level have chosen to lead a virtuous life (rather than a life guided by 
lower order desires). However, their knowledge seems to lose a battle with their desires and they have a 
tendency to do the wrong thing – or not to do the right thing. An athlete might have developed some sense of 
morality and believes that cheating is wrong, but is unable to resist the temptation when it arises.  
c) Self-control (continent) 
The self-controlled have a commitment to virtue. They also have a command over their desires and passions 
that those at the previous stage lack. Nevertheless they cannot be considered fully virtuous unless they feel a 
particular way about it. The self-controlled agent might experience frustration and difficulty yet act according to 
what virtue demands (Sanderse 2015, 392). The rugby player who grudgingly shakes the hand of their opponent 
might be at this stage.  
11 
 
d) Proper virtue (virtue in the full sense) 
As we have seen a key ingredient for proper virtue is practical wisdom.  According to Sanderse (2015, 393) 
‘People only reach the final stage of moral development when they possess this intellectual virtue, which forges 
the virtues into a complete stable and integrated collection.’   
A solution? 
The developmental strategy does not seem to solve the methodological difficulty I highlighted above. Judging 
any given athlete, or their actions, in light of the developmental criteria supplied by these stages similarly 
requires access to those internal mind states (cognition, intention, and emotion) that are not readily available. 
Our appraisal is dependent on data that is not available to us as observers. The evaluation of maturity on 
Aristotelian grounds shares some of the difficulties of evaluating moral maturity on Kohlbergian grounds. 
Approval or disapproval depends on information about agents’ mind states, but equally (or perhaps more) 
challenging, depends on the judge having a grasp of the ‘overall good’ against which to compare this particular 
agent’s act or character. Even judging the progress of virtue one has to some extent have a clear and developed 
conception of the overall good which means having the virtues and practical wisdom.  It seems to me that what 
actually happens when we approve or disapprove is that we see the behaviour and make all kinds of inferences 
about what is behind the behaviour. Sometimes our inferences enjoy a degree of intersubjective agreement and 
sometimes not. Sometimes our inferences are proved or disproved after the fact, as in the case of Roy Keane’s 
confession about his ‘revenge tackle’.  We can try to infer the complex cognitive processes ‘assigned an 
important role, specifically the role of regulating and facilitating the relations between situations and moral 
tendencies as well as the relations between moral tendencies and behaviour’ (Blasi 1980, 3), from observable 
behaviour, but this not a reliable method. It was for this reason (among others) that Skinner (1971) became 
sceptical about the role of cognition in all behaviour including moral acts. Even if we could agree on the so-called 
facts, making the call about the moral merits of the actions and actors in order to attribute virtue or ‘progress’ 
towards virtue is a significant challenge, particularly if we don’t know where our own character fits in the picture. 




There can be no single theory of morally good character.  This is not only because we disagree about 
what ways of being count as good.  It is also due to the fact that even when we agree on what counts 
as good, many different modes of psychological organization can bring about the desired class of 
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1 See Shields and Bredemeier (1995) for a comprehensive and empirically informed theory of moral character 
in sport. The book draws together important empirical and theoretical insights.  
2 I did look to defend the normative superiority of VE in my thesis and elsewhere 
3 Shields and Bredemeier [1995, 92] proposed their own model of moral action with a Kohlbergian cognitive 
development spine. Four processes, namely interpretation, judgment, choosing a value and implementation, 
they argued are involved in moral action 
                                                          
